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ABSTRACT
A heterogeneous distributed sensor network (HDSN) is a type of distributed sensor network where sensors with different
deployment groups and different functional types participate at the same time. In other words, the sensors are divided into
different deployment groups according to different types of data transmissions, but they cooperate with each other within
and out of their respective groups. However, in traditional heterogeneous sensor networks, the classification is based on
transmission range, energy level, computation ability, and sensing range. Taking this model into account, we propose a
secure group association authentication mechanism using one-way accumulator which ensures that: before collaborating
for a particular task, any pair of nodes in the same deployment group can verify the legitimacy of group association
of each other. Secure addition and deletion of sensors are also supported in this approach. In addition, a policy-based
sensor addition procedure is also suggested. For secure handling of disconnected nodes of a group, we use an efficient
pairwise key derivation scheme to resist any adversary’s attempt. Along with proposing our mechanism, we also discuss
the characteristics of HDSN, its scopes, applicability, future, and challenges. The efficiency of our security management
approach is also demonstrated with performance evaluation and analysis. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of hun-
dreds or thousands of inexpensive, low-powered sensing
devices with limited computational capacity and communi-
cation bandwidth. Typical tasks of sensor nodes are sensing
certain parameters from their surrounding environments
and sending the readings to a central entity called base
station or sink. With the rapid advancements of wireless
technologies and sophistication of sensing technologies,
the requirements of information types, data accuracy, and
security have also been increased rapidly. Though some
applications focus on collecting a specific type of data, uti-
lization of various types of data could be more beneficial
for extracting accurate and timely information. For exam-
ple, in a volcano monitoring application, only one type of
data, such as temperature, may be satisfactory for monitor-
ing. But the average temperature of a certain region along
with the seismic and acoustic readings can provide more
comprehensive information regarding an imminent event.
Again, for most of the applications, such as target track-
ing, environmental monitoring, and patient monitoring in
hospitals, it is necessary to acquire different types of data
from the same geographical region. Hence, multiple high-
precision and security information need to be provided by
WSN in many applications and network settings.
In order to getmultiple types of data, ExScalmote [1,2] is
designed by CrossBow Inc. and Ohio State University. This
Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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mote is basically an extension of the well-known MICA2
mote [3] which supports multiple sensors (i.e., sensing
units) on the same radio board. However, with the capa-
bilities of today’s sensors, instead of using this type of
multipurpose node in the network, using different types
of nodes that could collect data independently in the same
area could be more efficient considering the utilization of
memory, processing, and energy resources of the network.
Now, we have various sensors that can monitor tempera-
ture, pressure, humidity, soil makeup, vehicular movement,
noise level, lighting condition, the presence or absence of
certain kinds of objects, mechanical stress level on attached
objects, and other properties. Many innovative applications
could benefit a lot using the smart sensors. For example, in
the application of wind tunnel monitoring, sensor nodes are
responsible to collect temperature, humidity, light, pressure,
and other environmental parameters. One single kind of
node usually cannot complete the measurement and recog-
nition task of the environmental objectives, and only partial
or one-sided information can be received; hence the amount
of information that is received is very limited. In addition,
eachWSN node is also subject to quality, performance, and
noise of the wind tunnel, so the information collected is
often faced with greater uncertainty or even wrong. In such
a situation, using a certain number of WSN nodes collect-
ing different information separately could avoid the above
problems.We have providedmore points in the next section
to support this argument.
The key point here is that whatever the configurations of
the sensors are, data security is often deemed to be the most
important aspect. Because sensor networks often consti-
tute an information source that is a mission critical system
component and thus, require commensurate security pro-
tection. If an adversary can thwart the work of the network
by perturbing the generated information, stopping produc-
tion, or pilfering information, then the usefulness of sensor
networks is drastically curtailed. In order to guarantee data
security or network security, many mechanisms have been
proposed, such as intrusion detection system (IDS), pass-
word authentication, and so on. But first, it should be made
sure that the sensors that are participating in the data acqui-
sition and supplying process are authentic and are included
as legitimate entities in the network. To be specific, along
with other supporting security mechanisms, it is required to
verify the authenticity of the sensors before allowing them
to partake in any collaborative task. In this paper, we pro-
pose a secure group association authentication mechanism
to guarantee the security of sensor nodes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents the related works; heterogeneous distributed
sensor network (HDSN) is explained in Section 3; network
assumptions and preliminaries are presented in Sections 4
and 5; Section 6 presents our approach of secure group asso-
ciation management in HDSN; performance analysis and
discussions are presented in Section 7, and finally, Section
8 concludes the paper delineating the achievements from
this work with future research directions on various facets
of HDSN.
2. RELATED WORKS
Security is an important issue in WSNs. To ensure security
in a WSN, it is essential to encrypt messages and authen-
ticate the communicating nodes. For example, in Ref. [4],
the authors propose a Random Pairwise Key scheme, which
perfectly preserves the secrecy of the rest of the network
when any node is captured. Later on, a closest pairwise-key
predistribution scheme and a location-based pairwise-key
scheme [5] came as the alternative to Random Pairwise
Key scheme. This scheme takes advantage of the location
information to improve the key connectivity. Also, another
algorithm is presented that exploits location information
to implement key management. In Ref. [6], a group-based
key management model takes advantage of hexagonal grid
and expected location information not only to reduce the
memory cost but also to get better resilience against cap-
tured node attack. However, it has some weaknesses with
the impacts of node capture attack.
In Ref. [7], the authors propose a practical model of
deploying the sensors in groups. Here, the authors consider
deployment of sensor groups in such a way that the same
group members stay close to each other after the deploy-
ment in the network. Based on the deployment model, the
authors develop a novel group-based key predistribution
framework, which can be combined with any of the existing
key predistribution techniques.
In Ref. [8], a group rekeying scheme is presented for
broadcast security of a location aware WSN exploiting the
relative location information of nodes to construct secure
channels among the sensors and using those channels, the
base station delivers the group key to each node in the
network through a selected gateway node.
In Ref. [9], three types of nodes are defined: sensor
nodes, base station nodes, and process center. Based on
self-organizing clustering techniques, nodes are organized
into different groups. Every group has one base station node
and several sensor nodes. The base station node uses pre-
deployed hash function to compute communication keys
between different kinds of nodes in the network. There-
fore, it can decrease the communication cost of dispatching
keys. Meanwhile, the key management scheme is based on
the theory of combinatorial optimization and provides an
approach tomaintain security whilemembers have changed
in groups.
In Ref. [10], a secure, efficient, and authenticated group
key agreement protocol for WSNs is proposed by using
node-ID and bilinear pairings. In comparison with the pre-
vious group key management schemes for WSNs, this
scheme can defend against passive and active attacks,
against node compromised attack, ensure the backward
and forward security, and improve network computing
complexity.
Zhou et al. [11] propose a group-based key predistri-
bution scheme, GKE, which ensures secure node-to-node
communication between any pair of sensors. According to
Ref. [8],GKEprovides a number of advantages like; accom-
modating different deploymentmodels, establishing unique
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pairwise key regardless of sensor density or distribution,
nearly resilient feature against node capture attacks and low
communications overhead.
Considering in-network process such as data aggrega-
tion, we need to explore the way to build a secure group
communication for WSN. Prigent et al. [12] present a user-
friendly distributed approach to set up andmaintain a secure
long term community over a home ad hoc network. In their
scheme, there is no central point to the community because:
each device of the community considers itself as the cen-
tral point that is, any device can introduce any other in its
community provided that they can communicate, even over
insecure links.
Singh [13] does a study on the membership management
protocols for groups inWSNs. The author investigates vari-
ous sorts of applications, different geographic distributions,
andmembershipmodels relevant to sensor networks. InRef.
[14], a securemulticast group is established and a group key
is distributed by mutually authenticating a group of devices
over an open insecure wireless channel.
In Ref. [15], two centralized group rekeying (CGK)
schemes are proposed for secure group communication in
sensor networks. In the first scheme, the group controller
first obtains a group identifier from the base station and then
generates a random key as the group key. All the receivers
observing the same event would send a join request to
the group controller. The group controller authenticates the
request and unicasts the group key encrypted by the pair-
wise key to the sensor nodes. But it requires n unicasts of
messages to update the group key which may cause heavy
traffic in the area when the group size is large. So the group
key could be distributed through broadcasting.
Benaloh andMare [16] propose a one-way hash function
which satisfies a quasi-commutative property that allows
it to be an accumulator. This property could be used for
time stamping, building trust relationship between entities
in many systems, and for solving variety of problems. We
use the quasi-commutative property of one-way accumula-
tor (OWA) to serve our purpose of secure group association
management in HDSN.
In Ref. [17], the authors study a healthcare monitoring
architecture structured by three network tiers that provide
pervasive, secure access to wearable sensor systems and
wireless sensor motes. Their group-based approach to col-
lect and transmit data is shown suitable and efficient to
deal with medical services needed in a hospital. To secure
the data dissemination processes, the authors also propose
some security mechanism to encrypt the confidential data
within the network and thus protect the privacy of patient
information with a group security approach.
In Ref. [18], the authors develop a scheme for key man-
agement and rekeying in WSN based on the self-organized
structure, grid-loop. Based on the proposed grid-loop topol-
ogy, they propose new algorithms for keymanagement, i.e.,
forming grid-loops via Minimum Spanning Tree and form-
ing group key, to provide an original scheme to the WSN
for creating loop keys and their maintenance and renewing.
The idea of grid-loop is shown to be efficient compared to
other existing cluster-based network formation schemes to
deal with security issues.
Kifayat et al. [19] address group-based key management
for both static WSN and mobile sensor networks. In their
work, they providemathematical details of dealingwith key
management by using groupings within sensor networks.
Though this work is not directly related with our work, we
mention this as some of the concepts regarding formation
of groups and security mechanisms are useful.
Juwei and Liwen [20] present heterogeneousWSN struc-
ture where two types of sensor nodes are strategically
deployed over the target area. Based on the strategic deploy-
ment model, the authors propose a security scheme based
on Shamir secret sharing scheme. The work shows that the
group-oriented cryptography could work well in practical
cases for heterogeneous WSNs.
Motivated by these works, in this paper, we first propose
our networkmodelwhere sensors of different groups partic-
ipate together and then we present our approach of secure
group association management in the network. We adopt
OWA for testing the legitimacy of the group members (sen-
sors) in a particular group in the network. The subsequent




3.1. What is HDSN?
Typical “heterogeneity” in WSN is considered based on the
capabilities of the sensors in the network or more specif-
ically based on the memory, processing capability, energy
level, sensing range, and transmission range of the radio
[21,22]. These aspects are often related with each other.
For example, transmission range of a sensor depends on
the available level of energy. Larger transmission range
requires more energy or vice versa. So, in most of the cases,
the heterogeneity is defined considering the dissimilarities
in the energy level, processing power, and transmission
range. However, in our case this termmeans that the sensors
are associated with different groups, based on their func-
tional types and after deployment, they collaborate with one
another in the same group for doing any assigned task for
that particular group. This group concept is different than
the traditional relatively smaller groups (i.e., portions of the
network). Figure 1 shows an example scenario. In a partic-
ular HDSN, let us suppose that, the temperature sensing
sensors (type 1 sensors) form a portion of the total network
whose task is to sense and report the average temperature.
Side-by-side, there are other types of sensor groups (or
deployed groups, DGs) in the same area for other tasks like
monitoring the seismic signals in that area (consisting of all
the type 2 sensors in the figure), and a DG (composed of all
the type 3 sensors) for sensing the acoustic signals, etc.
We term our model network as HDSN, where sensors of
various functional capabilities form different network-wide
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Figure 1. An example of HDSN deployment. Here, T=3. Three types of sensors are dispersed over the same target area. The sensors
with the same functional type (e.g., all the same colored sensors) are associated with the same network-wide DG.
DGs [23]. There could be T (where, 1<T≤ 6) functional
types of sensors in the deployed network.We primarily con-
sider at most six types of nodes in the same HDSN as this
could be enough for supporting any of today’s applications
and many innovative multipurpose applications of sensor
networks in the coming future. The value of T could also be
set based on the application at hand. The network is called
homogeneous only when T= 1, that means there is only
one type of sensor in the whole network. For deploying the
entire network, first a number of different types of sensors
are taken and they are assigned different ids based on their
functional types.
Figure 1 shows a graphical model of a HDSN. In this fig-
ure, T= 3. Like any other distributed sensor network (DSN)
[24], it has a large number of sensors covering a large area.
The deployment is dense so that a particular network region
is covered perfectly. Also we assume that the sensors could
frequently be added or deleted from the network. In the
figure, we show three different sinks collecting data from
three different DGs. A DG is composed of only one type of
sensor and it spreads over the entire deployment area of the
network. The sinks shown in the model are interconnected
securely with each other. There could also be only one sink
gathering all forms of data from different DGs and sending
the readings to a operation and management center. In such
a case, the processing burden of the sink increases as it has
to collect, classify, and process different types of incoming
data simultaneously.
Each of the DGs covers the whole area of interest (AOI)
and works independently. However, the data packets from
a sensor in one DG could be relayed by the sensors under
another DG. So, practically in this sample HDSN, there
are three DSNs of different functionalities that are working
individually but side-by-side cooperating with each other
for data transmissions andnetwork operations.However, for
collaborating for a particular task, the neighboring sensors
must be the members of the same deployment group. That
means even if two dissimilar sensors are neighbors to each
other, they can only help in forwarding each other’s packets
but cannot take part in the same collaborative task. Figure
2 illustrates this. In the figure, three nodes 1, 2, and 3 are
neighbors of each other but each of them is from a different
network-wide DG. They can just relay each other’s packets
if needed (details are presented in Section 6.2.4), but cannot
participate in the same task.
3.2. Why HDSN?
An important point of argument can be that; instead of using
multiple nodes over the same area, similar data could be
achieved by using multipurpose nodes (like ExScal motes)
in the network. However, with the higher requirements of
the type and accuracy of data, we have found that our
approach is more efficient than the use of large number
of homogeneous multipurpose nodes. For example, in a
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Figure 2. A portion of a HDSN. Nodes in different DGs are neigh-
bors of each other but are not able to take part in the same
collaborative task. For a given collaborative task, two neighbors
must be of the same functional type. The distinguishable con-
necting lines show the achievable associations between any pair
of nodes of same type.
volcano monitoring or wind tunnel monitoring application,
utilization of our approach could obtain more accurate,
and comprehensive information. Some sample cases where
HDSN could be a preferable choice over other options are:
(i) Usingour approach could bemore efficient for saving
energy. Firstly, in HDSN, a particular DG could be
kept in sleep mode whenever necessary while other
DGs can keep functioning. Furthermore, at least one
DG could be preserved for a long time even if the
energies of other types of nodes are exhausted. These
two features can help for maximizing the lifetime of
the overall network without having an influence on
the connectivity of the whole network because of
the dense deployment of sensors. On the other hand,
ExScal type nodes need continuouswakemodewhen
any of the sensing units on the same radio board is
functioning. This eventually causes continuous con-
sumption of energy resource (i.e., battery). Putting
this type of multipurpose node in sleep mode means
all of the sensing units would become idle at the same
time.
(ii) Using our approach could be more efficient for
improving security of the overall network. HDSN
offers a great advantage over multipurpose node-
based network in case of physical capture attack.
If a physical intruder intends to hamper the sens-
ing of different parameters in a particular location,
it needs to destroy all types of sensors in that loca-
tion. For example, in our shown model, the attacker
needs to destroy at least three different type sensors
from a particular section of the network. On the other
hand, for a network consisted of multipurpose nodes,
destroying one node is enough to destroy three sens-
ing units assigned for a particular spot. The latter is a
relatively easier task for a physical intruder. In addi-
tion, different security levels could be set for different
DGs based on the requirements and/or functions of
the sensors.
(iii) In HDSN, the burden of cluster heads could be
reduced as different sinks associated with different
DGs can gather and analyze specific type of data sep-
arately. They can even collaborate with each other
after extracting the gist from the collected data. This
facility is not available if ExScal type motes are used
with a single sink. In many cases, multiple types
of readings from multipurpose nodes can somewhat
increase the complexity of tasks of the sink as it
has to classify and reorder incoming data prior to
manipulating them. Use of multiple sinks in such
case cannot even help as various types of data pack-
ets are amalgamated in the incoming traffic for each
sink.
As a whole, HDSN can provide more benefits that tradi-
tional sensor networks cannot. Taking such type of network
setting into consideration, in this paper, we propose an
approach of secure group association management within
the network. As our focus is on group association security
management, dealingwith other aspects ofHDSN is beyond
the scope of this paper. After all these introductory texts,
in the next two sections, we present the assumptions and
preliminaries for our approach.
4. NETWORK ASSUMPTIONS
4.1. Network structure
We assume that in each DG, for each participating node,
there is an end-to-end path from the corresponding sink.
That means in a particular DG Gi, i= 1, 2, 3 . . . .T (where T
is the maximum number of DGs in the HDSN), for each
node nGi , there is a path from the corresponding sink,
SGi → nmi → (nmi−1) → · · · nGi . We adopt a scheme like
that is presented in Ref. [25] for energy-efficient logical
structuring of the network to get a sink rooted tree (SRT) for
each DG. In this case, nGi is the leaf node and there could
be zero or more intermediate nodes along the end-to-end
path.
We assume that each sink associated with each DG has
enough processing power to do the initial calculations to ini-
tiate the network-wide groups in the network. The sensors
deployed in the network have the computational, memory,
communication, and power resources like that of the cur-
rent generation of sensor nodes (e.g., MICA2 motes [3] or
MICA2DOTmotes).Once the sensors are deployed over the
target area, they remain relatively static in their respective
positions; that means the neighboring nodes move together
(if mobility is allowed) or do not move at all. The trans-
missions of each node are isotropic (i.e., in all directions)
so that each message sent is a local broadcast within the
transmission range of the node.
Based on these network assumptions, our goal here is to
propose amechanism bywhich the nodes in a particular DG
Security Comm. Networks (2010) © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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might securely recognize one another so that any adverse
entity cannot in any way be included in the network within
its operation time. This kind of group association verifi-
cation could especially be required for performing some
collaborative tasks in the network. For example, when the
sink wants to know the average temperature of a certain
region, the temperature sensors in that region might have
to work together to measure the average of the temperature
readings over that particular area. There could also be some
sort of data aggregator or preprocessor which would be
responsible for doing the primary calculations. In fact, our
secure group association verification mechanism could also
be used with other clustering mechanisms where there are
some cluster heads present to collect these types of readings
from a certain set of sensors.
4.2. Security assumptions and threat model
Assumption 1. There is an IDS that reports about any sus-
picious behavior of nodes in the network.
Assumption 2. The base station is physically secure and
cannot be compromised in any way.
Due to the use of wireless communications, the nodes in
the network are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. We
assume that an adversary could try to eavesdrop on all traf-
fic, inject false packets, and replay older packets. The nodes
are not tamper-proof. If in any case, a node is compromised,
it could be a full compromise where all the information
stored in that particular sensor is exposed to the adversary
or could be a partial compromise, that is; partial informa-
tion is exposed. Full compromise means that the adversary
could use the secret information, cryptographic keys, sensor
readings, etc. for facilitating its own purpose. Finally, we
assume that it is possible that an attacker places malicious
nodes in the network to get into the network for participat-
ing in the collaborative tasks or a set of such nodes canwork
together for colluding against a legitimate group of nodes
(DG or subset of a DG) in the network.
5. BUILDING BLOCKS OF OUR
SECURITY MANAGEMENT SCHEME
In this section,we introduceOWAandpseudoinversematrix
which are used as the building blocks of our group associ-
ation security management approach.
5.1. One way accumulator
From the definition of a one-way function we know that it
is a function F with the property that; for a given x it is
easy to compute y=F(x). However, given F, y, it is com-
putationally infeasible to determine x such as x=F−1(y).
Generally, one-way functions take a single argument. How-
ever, Benaloh and Mare [16] considered hash functions
which take two arguments from comparably sized domains
and produce a result of similar size. In other words, accord-
ing to Ref. [16], a hash function is a function F with the
property that, F: A×B→C where, |A| ≈ |B| ≈ |C|. This
view introduces the one-way hash function with a spe-
cial quasi-commutative property which is termed as OWA.
According to the definition, OWA is a one-way function, f:
X×Y→X with the quasi-commutative property such that,
for all, x∈X and for all, y1, y2 ∈Y,
f (f (x, y1), y2) = f (f (x, y2, y1))
A family of OWAs is a family of one-way hash functions,
each of which is quasi-commutative.
This property is not unusual. In fact, addition and
multiplication modulo n both have this property as does
exponentiation modulo n when written as, en(x,y)= xy
mod n. Modular exponentiation also satisfies the quasi-
commutative property of OWA:
f (f (x, y1), y2) = f (f (x, y2), y1) = xy1y2modn
This could be extended for a long sequence of yj values
(where, j= 1, . . . ,m).
The quasi-commutative property of OWAs f ensures that
if one starts with an initial value, x∈X, and a set of values
y1, y2, . . . , ym ∈Y, then the accumulated hash,
z = f (f (f (· · ·f (f (f (x, y1), y2), y3), · · · , ym−2), ym−1), ym)
would be unchanged if the order of the yjs were permuted.
This feature could be used for membership verification in
a large set of entities. We adopt this feature of OWA for
secure group association authentication in HSDN.
5.2. Pseudoinverse matrix
The pseudoinverse matrix or generalised inverse matrix
[26--28] has a very nice property that could be used for
cryptographic operations. It is well known that a nonsingu-
lar matrix over any field has a unique inverse. For a general
matrix of dimension k×w, there might exist more than one
generalized inverse. This is denoted by, M(k, w)= {A:A is
a k×w matrix}. Let A∈M(k, w). If there exists a matrix
B∈M(w, k) such that; ABA=A and BAB=B then each of
A and B is called a generalized inverse matrix (or pseu-
doinverse matrix) of the other. In this paper, we use the
notation Ag to denote the generalized inverse matrix of A.
We use pseudoinversematrix for the pairwise key derivation
process presented later in the paper.
It should be noted that (Ag)g =A is not always true. The
set of all possible pseudoinverse matrices of A is denoted by
{Ag} and |{Ag}| is the cardinality of {Ag}. Then, we have:
Lemma 1 Let Ag be a pseudoinverse matrix of A. Then,
rank(Ag)= rank(A).
Lemma 2 Let A∈M(k,w)with rank(A) = k. If A can









: Z∈M(w−k, k) is an arbitrarymatrix
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.
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∈M(w, k). It is then easy to verify
that bothABA=A andBAB=Bhold if andonly ifX = A−11 .
6. SECURE GROUP ASSOCIATION
MANAGEMENT IN HDSN
6.1. Naive approach
The naive approach to maintain the group association infor-
mation of a particular group of sensors could be storing
the member ids in each sensor node’s memory. However,
the storage requirement for such member id list linearly
increases with the increase of the number of sensors in that
particular group. For the sensors with limited storage capa-
bilities, this is not a good solution. Hence, we employ an
efficient OWA-based scheme for managing the member-
ship information of a group in such a way that it could well
be supported by the storage and computation power of the
modern-era sensors. Also based on this limited information,
the sensors in a particular network-wide DG can securely
verify and recognize each other.
6.2. Our approach: based on one-way
accumulator and pseudoinverse matrix
6.2.1. Calculating partial accumulated hash
value (PHV).
In case of OWA, if the values y1, y2, · · · , ym are associ-
ated with the users of any cryptosystem, the accumulated
hash z of all of the yjs can be computed. A user holding
a particular yj can compute a partial accumulated hash zj
of all yj with i = j. The holder yj can then demonstrate that
yj was a part of the original hash by presenting zj and yj
such that; z= f(zj , yj). We use this partial accumulated hash
values (PHV) in the group association verification process.
The following subsections present our scheme in details.
6.2.2. Preprocessing and prestoring of PHVs.
Before deployment of a group of sensors (i.e., a network-
wide DG), the following steps are performed:
(i) A unique id; yj , j = 1, · · · ,m is assigned for
each sensor participating in a particular deployment
group.
(ii) Two safe relatively prime numbers, p and q= 2p+ 1
are generated.
(iii) n andφ(n) are computed as;n= pq andEuler’s totient
function, φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1).
(iv) A random number x (as a seed) is generated which
is same for every node in the group.
(v) PHV for each node yj is computed using the formula,
(vi) zj = x
∏m
i=1,i=j yimodn
(vii) Now the values of zj , n, φ(n), and corresponding yj
are stored in each sensor in that particular deploy-
ment group.
6.2.3. Post-deployment secure group
association verification.
After deployment of the sensors in the AOI, if a node
needs to verify the association of another node (whether
they are in the same DG or not), the PHVs and the identities
of the nodes are used. For example, let us suppose that
two nodes np and nq want to verify whether they are in the
same group or not. For this membership verification, these
two nodes exchange their prestored PHVs zp, zq and their
identities, yp and yq. Node nq calculates z = f (zp, yp) =
zp
ypmodn, while the other node calculates, z = f (zq, yq) =
zq
yqmodn locally. If both of the locally computed OWA
values match with each other, the nodes could be sure that
they are participating as the siblings in the same DG in
the HDSN. Once the accumulator value is calculated and
matched, it could be preserved in the node for successive
nodemembership verification for a given collaborative task.
6.2.4. Secure pairwise key derivation between
two sensors of two different DGs.
Since for each DG, there is a SRT (as mentioned in the
network assumption in Section 4), once a node in a partic-
ular DG finds and verifies its siblings, it can use them for
forwarding even its own readings (alongside the results of
collaborative tasks) towards the sink. The problem arises
when a node is disconnected or misplaced from all other
nodes of its own DG. It can happen due to the failure of an
intermediate node of the same DG, or because of random
(or, poor) deployment of the sensors of the same types. In
such a case, though the stranded node cannot participate
in the collaborative tasks within its area, it might need to
send its own readings to the sink/base station. In fact, it can
even happen for a subset of nodes associated with a partic-
ular DG. To handle this issue, our mechanism uses a simple
method of deriving pairwise keys [28] between two neigh-
boring sensors even if they are associated with two different
DGs. Here we describe the secure pairwise key derivation
method.
Let us consider that nGXand nGY are two nodes in the
deployment groups GX and GY . For some reason, nGX has
been disconnected from its siblings but it has got nGY as its
neighbor, which is connected with the SRT of its own DG
(i.e., GY ). To derive a shared secret key between these two
nodes, following operations are performed:
(i) NodenGX randomly generates amatrixXwith dimen-
sion m×w and its psedoinverse matrix, Xg. These
matrices are kept secret in the node.
(ii) nGXCalculates XgX and sends it tonGY .
(iii) In turn, NGY randomly generates another matrix Y
with dimensionw× k, andfinds out its pseudoinverse
matrix Yg. Thesematrices are also kept secret in node
NGY .
(iv) NGY Calculates XgXY andXgXYYg. Then it sends
the resultant matrices tonGX .
(v) Upon receiving the products of matrices fromnGY ,
nGX computes, XXgXYYg = XYYgand sends it back
tonGY .
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Figure 3. Pairwise key derivation process between two nodes.
(vi) Now, both the nodes nGXand nGY can compute
the common secret key. nGX gets it by cal-
culating X(XgXY ) = XY and nGY gets it by
calculating(XYYg)Y = XY . Both of these outcomes
(XY) are the same matrix with dimension m × k.
Figure 3 shows the communications between the two
neighboring sensors in the pairwise key derivation process.
Basically, the key XY is locally computed by each node
and the entire method is executed without the intervention
of any third party. The derived pairwise key now could be
used for secure communications between two nodes. In our
case, the node nGX encrypts all its readings using the shared
key (XY) and sends them to nGY which in turn uses its own
DG’s (i.e., GY ) SRT to forward those readings to the sink.
Such readings are sent with special marks in the packets
so that the corresponding sink can recognize the irregular
packets and hand those over to the appropriate sink (see Fig-
ure 1). In this way, the readings of a stranded node could
be utilized and two neighboring nodes associated with two
separate DGs can cooperate with each other for secure data
handover within the network.
Figure 4 shows an example scenario. In this figure, node
ns of type 3 is stranded from all of its other legitimate
siblings. It has got only type 1 and type 2 sensors as its
neighbors. In this case, node ns derives a pairwise key with
nf and forwards its readings to the sink/base station via
node nf (of type 1). If any collaborative task is assigned
for the type 1 sensors in that particular deployment region,
nf would work with other type 1 sensors avoiding ns as it
is not a legitimate member of its own DG (i.e., DG of nf ).
However, because of the request of ns (special case here),
it forwards the readings using its own DG. After receiving
the specially marked packets, the sink associated with nf
hands them over to the appropriate sink originally associ-
ated with ns. We term such a stranded node (ns), an orphan.
The immediate forwarder node (i.e., nf ) of different DG is
termed as the step-brother of the orphan.
6.2.5. Addition of new member in a
deployment group.
Addition of new sensors in a particular DG could be han-
dled in two ways. At the time of deploying the sensors, all
the sensors assigned for a group might not be used, rather
Figure 4. Delivery of data using an end-to-end path of a different
DG. Node ns and nf derived a pairwise key for their commu-
nications even though they are from different DGs. However,
they cannot partake in any collaborative task assigned for the
particular deployment region. Here, ns is an orphan and nf is the
step-brother of ns.
some of them could be kept for later use (depends on the
nature of application at hand). Say for example, total num-
ber of sensors in a group before deployment is λ. So, a
certain portion, say η of these sensors could be deployed
first for that particular group and the remaining, (λ−η) sen-
sors could be added later in the network. In such a case, all
the newly added sensors could still be able to prove their
legitimacy of group association to other already deployed
sensors in that group using our OWA-based verification
scheme. This way of addition of new nodes is basically a
policy-based management approach, where we handle the
addition of new sensors by employing a good deployment
strategy.
However, OWAs allow addition of completely new sen-
sors for a certain DG in the HDSN. For example, let us
consider that a new sensor has the id ynew, which is assigned
from the base station. Mathematically, the new OWA is,
znew = f (z, ynew). To inform all the sensors in that particu-
lar DG about the newly added sensor, the base station uses
the dedicated end-to-end path (according to our assump-






Before deployment of the new node, the base station cal-
culates its PHV and stores it in its memory. To add a new set
of sensors in a DG, the base station securely sends all the
ids of the newly included sensors to the deployed sensors of
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that deployment group. One special case exists when there
are one or more orphans in the network. In such case, as the
orphans are already cut off from their respective DGs, they
cannot receive the update messages about sensor addition.
Once a sensor gets an orphan status, it is not allowed to
rejoin its own DG even if it gets newly deployed sensors of
its own type as its neighbors (that could repair the broken
connection with other sensors of the same type). This pol-
icy is used to avoid complexity of recalculating the actual
PHV for the orphan as it might have missed several update
messages by the time it again gets one of its siblings as its
neighbor. So, for this case, the orphan just provides service
as a self-sufficient node to supply its own readings. As it
has already established a relation with other step-brother, it
can keep that relation until it is out of battery. Note that this
policy does not prevent other legitimate nodes in the SRT
of the original DG from proper functioning. They could
simply follow the calculations and remain in the group as
legitimate entities.
6.2.6. Deletion of member from a deployment
group.
Any suspicious behavior detected by the IDS could con-
vince the base station (or, sink) to purge any sensor from
a particular deployment group in the HDSN. To purge an
adverse node yadv, the sink uses the secure end-to-end paths
for the sensors in the DG to send the id of the deleted node.
Getting the delete command, each of the remaining nodes
calculates the stored PHV using the equation,
zu j = zjy
−1
adv mod φ(n) mod n
Euler’s totient function φ(n)is used here for the modular
operation to ensure that underflow does not occur and the
purged id could not be reused by any adversary. In case of a
node failure due to any unwanted incident like power outage
(or other), it should be made sure that the node’s id could
not be used by any other entity or any attacker. So, to handle
this, the same procedure for node purging is employed. In
all of these cases, the sink is responsible for taking the deci-
sion of purging. In some applications, where the clustering
techniques are employed, it is possible to assign the charge
of taking group-related decisions to the cluster head of the
particular cluster (or subgroup). In this case, our scheme
offers a decentralized node membership verification mech-
anism and reduces the burden of tasks of the corresponding
sink. For handling the presence of orphans in the network,
same policy as stated in previous section (Section 6.2.5) is
employed.
7. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND
DISCUSSION
We analyzed our scheme in terms of storage requirements,
computation costs, communication costs, security, and scal-
ability. To understand the performance of our approach, in
our system setting, we varied the number of nodes in the
deployment groups from 100 to 1000. In this section, we
present the analysis and discussion about the efficiency and
applicability of our approachwith current generation sensor
nodes.
7.1. Storage requirements
As we use similar type of scheme like RSA [29], like RSA
cryptosystem, our scheme requires that the size of n should
be sufficiently large, typically 1024 bits or more. We con-
sidered different lengths of zj , n, φ(n) with three different
lengths of the ids of the nodes; 128 , 512 , and 1024 bits.
Each sensor node in a particular deployment group has to
store little information; only four values for the secure group
association verification mechanism. Figure 5a,b shows the
storage requirements for a single sensor when our scheme
is employed considering different lengths for the stored
parameters. In Figure 5a, lengths of zj , n, φ(n) are con-
sidered as 1024 bits and in Figure 5b, they are 1280 bits.
We took MICA2 mote as a standard specification. Cross-
bow MICA2 mote [3] is a well-known sensor node with an
ATmega128L 8-bit processor at 8MHz, 128 KB program
memory (flash), and 512 KB additional data flash memory.
Usually it is powered by 2 AA sized batteries. Consider-
Figure 5. Storage requirements for different length node ids
keeping the lengths of other parameters (a) 1024 bits (b) 1280
bits.
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Figure 6.Storage requirement for a single node in naive approach
(for different lengths of IDs) and our OWA-based scheme (consid-
ering ids 1024 bits and each of other values 1280 bits in length).
ing this configuration, our scheme requires only a small
amount ofmemorywhile a large portion ofmemory remains
available for other associated mechanisms to run smoothly.
An alternative method of group association management
is to store all the ids of the sensors (naive approach) par-
ticipating in the same group. But, compared to our scheme,
this approach is very inefficient. In Figure 6, we show that
if simple membership list is stored for the same purpose, it
requiresmuchmore storage than our OWA-based approach.
In fact, for a small number of nodes (100--300), the stor-
age requirements are very high which could in fact hamper
proper functioning of other schemes running alongside
group association management scheme. While for differ-
ent length ids, naive approach (storing membership list)
requires huge amount of memory; in OWA-based approach,
considering the lengths of other parameters even 1280 bits
(which is good enough for the security) and id length 1024
bits, the memory requirement is fairly less. A great advan-
tage of our approach is that the increase of the number of
nodes in the DG does not affect the storage requirements
for a sensor. Moreover, the pairwise key derivation method
does not need any prior storing of information (predistribu-
tion) in the sensors’ memories rather the scheme could be
used whenever needed for handling orphans. Hence, with
our mechanisms, a large number of nodes can be supported
for a HSDN. For larger lengths of n and other parameters,
the storage requirement increases. However, still it is fairly
affordable by today’s sensors and comparatively much less
than that of storing the whole membership list.
7.2. Computation costs
A great advantage of our approach is that; as the entire pre-
processing phase (presented in Section 6.2.2) is done by
the base station (or, management center), the sensors do
not need to bother about the calculations and no extra sen-
sor resource is used for initializing the deployable groups
(DGs). The sensors need to use the processing resources
only for verification, sensor addition, or sensor deletion pro-
cess. We found that; in the verification step for calculating
the accumulator value, a node takes only about 3ms when
1024 bit id is used. This processing time is fair enough for
such a scheme. Depending upon the size of the id, the pro-
cessing time varies a little. In case of handling an orphan, to
derive pairwise key, we have used linear matrix operations,
more specifically matrix multiplication. The complexity of
matrix multiplication is very low; hence it could be per-
formed very quickly. As all the computations in this case
are linear, they can be performed very easily. The point that
should be mentioned here is that; having orphans in the net-
work is the worst case. So the key derivation method might
not even be needed if an efficient deployment strategy is
used for deploying the sensors uniformly in the network. As
we use the protocol presented in Ref. [25] for SRT mainte-
nance, each DG could lose energy in an efficient way so that
a DG remains connected before its full exhaustion and no
orphan is created due to the power outage of the intermediate
nodes.
7.3. Communications costs
In the post-deployment secure group association verifica-
tion phase, only two message transmissions are needed
between two neighboring nodes. This process is iterated
among the neighbors to ensure the legitimacy of each other
and the pairwise authentications could be sufficient to legit-
imize a good number of nodes of same type (or, a subset of
nodes) in a particular deployment area.
Say for example, nodes A and B, two neighbors veri-
fied each other as siblings. C is a neighbor of B, but not a
neighbor of A. B and C can verify each other’s legitimacy.
If all of them are of same type and any of them has not
already got the orphan status, they (A, B, and C) can ver-
ify each other and then can work together for any assigned
collaborative task. In this example case, if C is also a neigh-
bor of A, they again can authenticate each other. Then, the
whole subgroup becomes pairwise authenticated (shown in
Figure 7). As the deployment is dense, there could be many
such subgroups within the network. One of the nodes can
take the role of the leader to accumulate the readings of
the verified nodes for that collaborative task. The details
of data aggregation and distributed manipulation of sen-
sor readings are beyond the scope of this paper as here we
focus on the group security management issues only. As
the transmissions of the nodes are isotropic, the neighbors
can communicatewithin their transmission circles and these
could be done with usual neighbor communications meth-
ods.When sensors are added in the network or deleted from
the network, the update messages need to be sent through-
out the SRT of a particular DG. These communications are
done using the scheme we adopted from Ref. [25]. So,
as the information about addition/deletion is transmitted
as a part of that scheme, there is no extra communication
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Figure 7. Example scenario of a pairwise authentication case.
Nodes A, B, and C authenticated each other using the OWA-
based verification mechanism and all of them are of same type.
Simple neighbormessages could be used to exchange PHVs and
ids of the nodes. All these nodes could partake in a collaborative
task. Dotted circles show the transmission ranges of the nodes.
needed to support our secure group associationmanagement
scheme.
If there are orphans in the network, pairwise secret key
derivation is needed. In this scheme, total number of trans-
missions needed is three. The sending entity sends anw×w
matrix which is ofw2 bits. In turn, the receiving entity sends
a w× k matrix and an w×w matrix. For this the total num-
ber of bits passed for the matrices is, w2 + wk = w(w + k)
bits. Again, the sending entity sends the receiving entity
m×w bits. So, total number of bits (for the matrices) needs
to be exchanged in this method is,
w2 + w(w + k) + mw
= w(w + w + k + m)
= w(2w + k + m) bits.
7.4. Security analysis
7.4.1. Analysis on one way accumulator.
Now, let us analyze the security level of our schemes.
One-way accumulator uses one-way hash function which
means that; given x∈Xand y∈Y , for a given y′∈Y , it is dif-
ficult to find some x′∈X such that; f (x, y) = f (x′, y′). So,
an adversary that wants to forge a particular y’ would face
the difficulty of constructing an x’ with the property that;
z = f (x′, y′). Likewise, in our scheme, the use of arbitrary
values for PHV and identity of node cannot pass the group
association verification mechanism and the adversary can-
not in any way be included in the deployment group even
if it is of same functional type. A potential threat is that if
a dishonest member in the group tries to construct a false
pair (x′, y′) such that,z = f (x′, y′) by combining various
node identities (yjs) in one-way or another. However, as
mentioned earlier, this is not practical as the adverse node
faces the difficulty of finding such a pair. Other methods of
generating the pair might be possible. However, this could
be handled by restricting the choice of the identities (set of
yjs) of nodes, which is dependent on the decision of the cen-
tral entity and based on the application requirements and/or
network settings.
In the preprocessing stage, we use a rigid value of n.
According to Benaloh and Mare [16], the advantage of
using a rigid integer, n = pq is that the group of squares
(quadratic residues) modulo n that are relatively prime to n
has the property that it has size, n′ = ((p−1)/2)/((q−1)/2)
and the function, en(x, y) = xymodn is a permutation of this
group whenever y and n’ are relatively prime. Thus, if the
factorization of n is hidden, “random” exponentiations of
an element of this group are extremely unlikely to produce
elements of any proper subgroup. This means that repeated
applications of en(x, y) are extremely unlikely to reduce the
size of the domain or produce random collisions. Although
constructing rigid integers is somewhat harder than con-
structing ordinary, “difficult to factor” integers, it is still
quite feasible.
7.4.2. Analysis on pseudoinverse matrix.
In the pairwise secret key derivation method, we use
the public channel for the message transmissions. How-
ever, capturing the messages like XgX, XgXY , XgXYYg,
andXYYg could not be helpful to construct the locally com-
puted secret shared key XY. It might seem that a prospective
attack would be by gaining some information of matrix Y
from the knowledge of XgX and XgXY . Let us consider,







Here, Ir is an identity matrix of order r× r. Then, only
the first r rows of Y can be determined from XgXY . As Y
is chosen randomly, there are 2(w−r)k ways to choose the
last (w--r) rows of Y. The knowledge of XgXYYg might be
helpful in determining Y but according to lemma 2 it does
not help much to the adversary. Without the knowledge of
last (w--r) rows of Y, even if X is completely known, the
probability for determining the correct value of each ele-
ment of XY would be 0.5, considering that any row vector
of X has a nonzero element in any of the last (w--r) posi-
tions, which is likely when (w--r) is considerably large and
X is chosen at random. However, the possibility of getting
X from the knowledge of XgXYYgand XYYg is even smaller
as rank(AgABBg) ≤ rank(AgA). So, it could be assumed
that based on the above analysis of the pairwise key deriva-
tion phase, the probability of successful breaking of this
scheme is, 2−(w−r)k. So, the security of the pairwise key
derivation scheme is reasonably high for carefully chosen
parameters. To ensure that 2(w−r)k is a large number, the w
for this schememust be considerably larger than r. And this
can be guaranteed by making sure that m<w.
A potential attack could arise in the pairwise key deriva-
tion process if there exists any sort of identification problem
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of the participating entities during the communications. In
our scheme, however, this threat is debilitated to an accept-
able level because; firstly, the presence of orphans and thus
the utilization of pairwise key derivation method is not
likely if a good deployment policy is used where the sen-
sors of a particular type are deployed uniformly and densely.
Secondly, even if an adversary pretends to be an orphan and
establishes key with a step-brother, it can only do harm by
injecting huge number of false packets. As it cannot partici-
pate in the collaborative tasks, it cannot extract information
from the network and in fact, it has to work more than the
benefit it can get from such activities. Thirdly, even if the
adversary pretends to be an orphan and derives a pairwise
key, this key does not have any other use except using it for
delivering the generated false readings. Finally, if the first
packet reaches the sink along the path of the step-brother’s
SRT (or, for its DG), the sink can check the id of the source
of the specially marked packet and as it has the complete
list of authentic members of a group, it can easily detect the
falsehood and block further reception of packets from such
source. This operation is basically a part of the IDS that
runs side-by-side our approach. The IDS also filters out the
spoofed ids of sensors. Details of the IDS and its methods
of operations are left as our future work and will be noted
in our future publications.
In fact, such activity by an adversary requires it to be
an insider in the network which would not be allowed by
the efficient IDS present in the network. If the adversary
generates packets as an outsider, the sink will do the rest for
stopping/blocking its production of false readings as stated
earlier. As a whole, the probability of such attack is very
low and even if it occurs, the level of damage from such
attack is fairly manageable.
7.4.3. Analysis on intrusion detection system
(IDS).
A potential attack against HDSN could be network sub-
stitution attack [30]. In such kind of attack, the adversaries
take control of the entire network or a portion of it using
a set of colluding malicious nodes. Once the rogue nodes
are somehow included in the SRT of a DG, they can launch
collusion attack. If that particular portion of the network is
chosen for a collaborative task, all these colluding nodes can
generate false reports. Also, when the adversaries control a
portion of the network, they can perform other attacks such
as traffic analysis and selective or complete packet drop-
ping.However, in our secure group associationmanagement
scheme, such types of attacks could easily be foiled. The
IDS present in the network would work for detecting the
presence of rogue nodes. Even if a number of colluding
nodes are included in the SRT of a particular DG, they must
know the information prestored in the legitimate sensors’
memories. If PHV value and legitimate id are not known,
none of the rogue nodes can produce proof of its authen-
ticity to a legitimate member and thus cannot participate in
the collaborative task.
If a legitimate node of a DG is fully compromised, all
the prestored values might be known to an attacker. In such
case, the attacker could use the information for including
itself in any collaborative task. However, the extent of dam-
age from such type of insider attack could be less if a single
node is compromised as it cannot alter the result of the
collaborative task as the readings from several sensors are
considered together. Only way the attacker can forge the
result is by producing outlier (an extreme deviation from
mean). It is expected that detecting such extreme deviation
in sensor readings is one of the responsibilities of the dis-
tributed IDS employed in the network. If a good number
of nodes are fully compromised and their data are used for
network substitution attack, this is the worst-case scenario.
The burden of detection and exclusion of the rogue nodes
again lies on the IDS that we have left as our future work.
7.5. Energy analysis
As we have mainly focused on the novel deployment
model of the network, only some portions need the energy
analysis. For the pairwise scheme, we have analyzed the
energy consumption and found that our scheme could be
easily supported by the modern day sensor nodes. For
energy analysis, we considered the specifications of Berke-
ley/Crossbow MICA2DOT motes (a version of MICA2)
[31]. Thesemotes are equippedwith eight-bit ATmega128L
microcontrollers with a 4MHz clock speed, 128 kB pro-
gram memory and Chipcon CC1000 low-power wireless
transceiverwith a 433--916MHz frequency band. Themajor
power consumers in this mote are the processor and the
wireless transceiver. During the transmission and reception
operations, the microcontroller is turned on along with the
wireless transceiver. According to our findings, the cost of
transmission of one byte is 59.2µJ, while the reception
operation has about half the transmission cost (28.6µJ).
The power to transmit one bit is equivalent to roughly 2090
clock cycles of execution of the microcontroller. In our cal-
culation, we considered a packet size of 41 bytes (payload
of 32 bytes, header 9 bytes). With an eight byte preamble
(source and destination address, packet length, packet ID,
CRC, and a control byte) for each packet; we found that
to transmit one packet 49× 59.2= 2.9008≈ 2.9mJ energy
is required. Accordingly, the energy cost for receiving the
same packet is 49× 28.6= 1.4014≈ 1.4mJ. Overall, the
scheme is within the energy resource budget of current-
generation sensor nodes.
7.6. Scalability
Our approach is fairly scalable. As the number of nodes in
a DG does not affect the amount of memory needed for a
DG verification method, a large number of nodes could be
initialized before deployment. Also, new sensors could be
added, if necessarywith the same lowmemory requirement.
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This particular advantage of memory efficiency also helps
our approach to be fairly scalable.
7.7. Further discussion
In this paper, we have focused on ensuring secure group
association management for the DGs in HDSN. Other secu-
rity mechanisms can run side-by-side our schemes. In our
approach, several groups of sensors could operate in the
same HDSN at the same time without hampering each
other’s operations. If required, there could be some other
mechanisms for the communications between the sinks of
different groups or the nodes of different groups. This actu-
ally depends on the type of service required from the HDSN
or the application at hand. At the time of deployment, if
policy-based deployment is used, a certain portion of the
sensors could be kept for future deployment. Yet, it would
not affect anything in the deployed sensor group and all
the other sensors in the DG can still verify each other’s
legitimacy of membership.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
SCOPES OF RESEARCH
The major contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) We have proposed a new deployment model of DSN
termed HDSN.
(ii) Based on the novel deployment model, we then
proposed a secure group association management
scheme. Our scheme could be employed along-
side other supplementary security mechanisms for
HDSN.
(iii) We also have presented a pairwise secret key deriva-
tionmethod between two different sensor nodes. Our
analysis shows that this approach requires consider-
ably very small storage and processing power, and
is efficient enough to ensure secure membership of
nodes in the deployment groups in HDSN.
Our work opens the door for research on other interest-
ing issues in HDSN. For example, handling heterogeneous
traffic, prioritized data, maintaining heterogeneous levels of
security, quality of service of heterogeneous data, lifetime
maximization of deployment groups, etc. could be some
of the challenging research issues for HDSN. As our future
work, wewill develop an efficient distributed IDS that could
run alongside our approach for ensuring robust security in
this type of wireless network.
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